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INTRODUCTION 
It was the middle of the summer, and an eighteen-year-old boy 
sat alone in his truck in Fairhaven, Massachusetts, waiting to die.1 
In his backseat, a gasoline-powered water pump emitted 
dangerous carbon monoxide levels within the confined space of the 
vehicle.2 At some point, fear overcame the boy as he realized that 
the carbon monoxide was beginning to steal his life.3 He exited the 
truck in a panic.4 His girlfriend, who was on the phone with him at 
the time, gave him one simple command: “Get back in.”5 
The following afternoon, on July 13, 2014, a local police officer 
found the dead body of Conrad Roy.6 During the investigation that 
ensued in the wake of Roy’s suicide, local law enforcement 
reviewed Roy’s electronic communications.7 Their findings caused 
officials to more closely examine his relationship with his 
girlfriend, seventeen-year-old Michelle Carter.8 The officials 
discovered that Carter and Roy met in 2011 and dated at various 
times in the three years that followed.9 The majority of  
this relationship and contact took place via text messages and 
cellphone conversations.10 
The content of these electronic communications was of 
particular concern to the police.11 While Roy had a history of mental 
health issues and attempted suicides, Carter appeared to have 
exacerbated her boyfriend’s problems by constantly encouraging 
Roy to kill himself.12 For example, in the days leading up to his 
death, Carter and Roy had brainstormed ideas for devices that 
could produce carbon monoxide.13 Carter had suggested that Roy 
“Google ways to make it[,]” and subsequently recommended using 
 
 1. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1056 (Mass. 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1059 n.8. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1056. 
 7. Id. at 1057. 
 8. Id. at 1056–57. 
 9. Id. at 1057. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1057 n.4. 
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a generator.14 The next day, Carter sent Roy a text promising that 
she would stay up with him if he wanted to kill himself that night.15 
When Roy responded that he wished to wait, Carter replied, “You 
can’t keep pushing it off.”16 Over text, Carter promised to take care 
of Roy’s family after his death, and she threatened to get him help 
unless Roy went through with his suicide plan.17 She also 
recommended that he “go in a quiet parking lot” to kill himself.18 
Finally, the morning before Roy committed suicide, Carter sent 
increasingly demanding texts to Roy.19 For example, she told him, 
“You keep pushing it off and you say you’ll do it but u [sic] never 
do. Its [sic] always gonna [sic] be that way if u [sic] don’t take 
action . . . . You’re just making it harder on yourself . . . , you just 
have to do it . . . .”20 
While these messages may seem incriminating, none of these 
texts truly convinced Judge Lawrence Moniz to find Carter guilty 
of involuntary manslaughter. In a widely publicized decision,21 
Judge Moniz explained that Roy was in fact responsible for his own 
death in the time period leading up to his suicide.22 Judge Moniz 
found that Roy, who struggled with mental health problems, “took 
significant actions of his own towards” ending his life.23 These 
actions included researching methods of suicide, securing a 
generator, obtaining a water pump, placing his truck in an 
unnoticeable area, and turning on the pump.24 However, Judge 
Moniz stressed that Roy “br[oke] that chain of self-causation by 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1057 n.3. 
 16. Id. at 1057. 
 17. Id. at 1058 nn.5–6. 
 18. Id. at 1058 n.6. 
 19. Id. at 1057 n.4. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye & Jess Bidgood, Guilty Verdict for  
Young Woman Who Urged Friend to Kill Himself, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/suicide-texting-trial-michelle-carter-conrad-
roy.html. 
 22. Dan Glaun, Michelle Carter Trial: Watch Guilty  
Verdict Being Read by Judge Lawrence Moniz, MASSLIVE (June 15, 2017), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2017/06/verdict_reached_in_michelle_ca.htm
l. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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exiting the vehicle. He t[ook] himself out of the toxic environment 
that it ha[d] become.”25 
It was then that Carter told Roy to return to the truck and finish 
the job, even knowing Roy’s history and his fears. At that exact 
moment, Judge Moniz reasoned, Carter became responsible for 
Roy’s life.26 Judge Moniz found that “instructing Mr. Roy to get 
back in the truck constituted . . . wanton and reckless conduct by 
Ms. Carter,” which created a situation where it was highly likely 
that substantial harm would befall Roy.27 
The court found that Carter’s instructions to “get back in” the 
truck created the circumstances that threatened Roy’s life.28 The 
court held that, therefore, Carter had “a duty to take reasonable 
steps to alleviate the risk,” the failure of which can result in a charge 
of manslaughter under Massachusetts law.29 Judge Moniz found it 
damning that Carter took no such steps, asserting that “[Carter] did 
not call the police or Mr. Roy’s family. . . . She called no one. And 
finally, she did not issue a simple, additional instruction: Get out of 
the truck.”30 Instead, Carter simply listened to the sound of the 
motor and to Roy’s coughs as her boyfriend died, obeying her 
instructions until his last breath.31 For these reasons, the court 
found that, “Carter’s actions, and also her failure to act, where she 
had a self-created duty to Mr. Roy since she had put him into that 
toxic environment, constituted . . . wanton and reckless conduct” 
sufficient for a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.32 In  
February of 2019, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
affirmed Judge Moniz’s decision without conditions or 
reservations.33 Michelle Carter appealed her conviction to the 
United States Supreme Court on July 8, 2019, but the certiorari 
petition was denied.34  
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). 
 34. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carter v. Commonwealth, No. 19-62 (U.S. July 8, 
2019); see also Doha Madani, Michelle Carter, Who Encouraged Boyfriend’s Suicide, Appeals to 
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This Note argues that the Massachusetts court overreached to 
criminalize Michelle Carter’s conduct. The court based its decision 
solely on her words of encouragement and enticement to commit a 
suicide, despite her physical absence and lack of action. It is 
possible that the court in Massachusetts reached the correct 
outcome for Michelle Carter’s case. But absent legislative guidance 
on this issue, the court’s decision to innovate the law of suicide in 
Carter exhibited a troubling display of judicial activism and was an 
improper means to achieve such a result. If a state like 
Massachusetts desires to penalize suicide encouragement, 
especially encouragement through electronic communications, this 
legal standard should be articulated clearly and carefully by 
statute. This would put citizens like Michelle Carter on fair notice 
of the criminality of such behavior. It would also more accurately 
reflect the will of the people through their elected representatives, 
rather than encouraging legislating from the bench.  
This Note will proceed as follows: Part I steps back to analyze 
the historical and current legal landscape of the criminality of both 
assisting and encouraging suicide. This Part delves into the 
different categories of culpability within suicide law, concluding 
that the guilty verdict in Carter, based on words alone, was an 
atypical outcome under the majority of state suicide laws within 
the United States. Part II examines the outcome in Michelle Carter’s 
specific case, particularly focusing on the court’s reasoning in 
reaching its verdict. This examination argues that the court’s 
decision, in the absence of statutory guidance, demonstrated 
judicial overreaching. Part III finds that the environment 
surrounding the issue of encouraging suicide has altered in recent 
years, particularly exploring the effects of modern developments in 
technology on criminal suicide law. Due to these changes, this Part 
argues that updated guidance from legislators is necessary to 
reflect these changes. Part IV then explores the potential 
ramifications of the Michelle Carter conviction. The argument in 
this Part asserts that her conviction will have a major impact on 
future actions against those who are charged for words that may 
have swayed another’s suicidal thoughts into action. Part V 
 
Supreme Court, NBC NEWS (July 8, 2019), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/michelle-carter-who-encouraged-boyfriend-s-suicide-appeals-supreme-court-
n1027601.  
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recommends how cases like Carter should be approached as digital 
communications and modern technology continue to advance.  
Ultimately, this Note contends that the most suitable way to 
criminalize suicide encouragement is through clear, carefully 
written statutory law that is careful to take evolving technology 
into account and to avoid treading on the First Amendment’s 
protection of speech.  
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ENCOURAGING SUICIDE 
To better understand the outcome of Michelle Carter’s case, it is 
necessary to first examine the historical and modern perspectives 
toward those who commit suicide and those who assist the 
commission of suicide within the scope of criminal law. The 
following discussion will begin by analyzing the history of suicide 
in the legal context, followed by an overview of the modern legal 
approach to suicide, including an explanation of the laws 
governing suicide assistance, suicide pacts, and suicide 
encouragement. This landscape of suicide law revealed in the 
following discussion will clarify that Carter’s conviction was an 
incorrect exercise of judicial activism.  
A. A History of Suicide in the Context of Criminal Law 
The history of suicide as a punishable action stretches back at 
least to the ancient Greek era.35 Speaking on the subject of suicide, 
Plato said that “[t]hey who meet their death in this way shall be 
buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be 
buried ingloriously . . . in such places as are uncultivated and 
nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their 
interment.”36 
Similarly, in England, beginning in the mid-thirteenth century, 
suicide was a felony; if a man ended his own life, he was denied a 
Christian burial.37 Instead, his body would be dumped in a pit at a 
crossroads.38 Further, his family would be deprived of all its 
 
 35. See PLATO, LAWS 220 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Prometheus Books 2000) (1892). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Gerry Holt, When Suicide Was Illegal, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/magazine-14374296. 
 38. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425 (1877). 
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belongings, which would instead be turned over to the Crown.39 
Up until 1961, those in England or Wales were still subject to 
criminal prosecution for merely attempting suicide.40 
The laws in the United States originally followed this same 
societal condemnation of suicide.41 Under the common law, the 
commission of suicide was considered “an unlawful act.”42 During 
this era, “[i]n the eye of the law, self-destruction . . . [wa]s an 
offense,” and any individual committing suicide would be in 
violation of the law.43 As such, suicide under common law was 
punishable by forfeiture of the offender’s property and an 
ignominious burial of the decedent’s body.44 This practice was 
similar to the old philosophies and attitudes toward suicide in 
Greece and England.45 However, the laws have adjusted as 
society’s general attitude toward suicide has softened. While some 
jurisdictions in the United States still consider suicide a common-
law crime,46 no states currently maintain any statute criminalizing 
the commission of suicide. The modern view is that suicide is no 
longer punishable under American law.47 
This raises the central question as to whether the assistance or 
encouragement of suicide should remain illegal. It seems 
inequitable for courts to punish a defendant who helps a victim 
 
 39. See Burnett v. People, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (Ill. 1903) (“By the English common law 
suicide was a felony, and the punishment for him who committed it was interment in the 
highway with a stake driven through the body, and the forfeiture of his lands, goods, and 
chattels to the king.”); see also Mink, 123 Mass. at 425. 
 40. Holt, supra note 37. In fact, in 1956, 613 failed suicide attempts were prosecuted 
under English law. Id. Although most of these individuals were discharged, fined, or put on 
probation for their actions, thirty-three of these attempts resulted in imprisonment. Id. 
 41. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (“[F]or over 700 years, the 
Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both 
suicide and assisting suicide.”). 
 42. 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 5 (2017); see also State v. Reese, 633 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. 2006) 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Belcher, 685 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 2009). 
 43. State v. Levelle, 13 S.E. 319, 321 (S.C. 1891). 
 44. Suicide, supra note 41. 
 45. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text. 
 46. Suicide, supra note 42; see also Hill v. Nicodemus, 755 F. Supp. 692, 693 (W.D.  
Va. 1991) (“[A]lthough the state cannot punish a suicide, it in fact remains a common  
law crime.”). 
 47. In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Cal. 1983) (“[P]unishing suicide is contrary to 
modern penal and psychological theory.” (quoting VICTOR M. VICTOROFF, THE SUICIDAL 
PATIENT: RECOGNITION, INTERVENTION, MANAGEMENT 173–74 (1982))). 
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accomplish a perfectly legal act.48 In fact, there is a modern crusade, 
known as the Right-to-Die Movement, which actively supports the 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide.49 This movement began 
in the 1970s.50 Since that time, the issue of whether the terminally 
ill should have a right to die peacefully on their own terms has been 
intensely debated.51 The majority of states have not adopted laws 
permitting any form of assisted-suicide. But the movement reflects 
a shift over the last several decades in the overall attitude toward 
suicide. Thus far, eight jurisdictions have legalized physician-
assisted suicide, with nineteen additional states currently 
considering a physician-assisted suicide statute.52 
Nevertheless, the taking of one’s life is still highly discouraged 
and disapproved of generally throughout the United States. Most 
citizens consider the prevention of suicide to be “a legitimate and 
compelling interest” because “[t]he preservation of life has a high 
social value in our culture and suicide is deemed ‘a grave public 
wrong.’”53 Because of this reverence for life and moral aversion to 
suicide in American society, the majority of states have elected to 
preserve at least some form of liability in suicides—most notably 
for those who either assist in or encourage suicide.54 
 
 48. See Brittani Ready, Words as Weapons: Electronic Communications That Result in 
Suicide and the Uncomfortable Truth with Criminal Culpability Based on Words Alone, 36 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 133 (2017). 
 49. See Sarah Childress, The Evolution of America’s Right-to-Die Movement, FRONTLINE 
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-evolution-of-americas-
right-to-die-movement/. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Take Action: Death with Dignity Around the U.S., DEATH WITH DIGNITY, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/take-action/ (last updated Oct. 10, 2019) [hereinafter 
Take Action]. Nine jurisdictions—California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, 
New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—have passed Death with Dignity statutes, 
while Montana has legalized physician-assisted suicide by court decision. Id. 
 53. Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); see also 
Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 147 P.2d 227, 229 (Or. 1944) (“[S]elf destruction 
ordinarily involves moral turpitude and is undoubtedly regarded as being wrong.”); 
Bisenius v. Karns, 165 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Wis. 1969) (“There is in the law no sanction for self-
destruction . . . .”). 
 54. See generally 96 Am. L. Rep. 6th 475 (2014); see also ROBERT RIVAS, FINAL EXIT 
NETWORK, INC., SURVEY OF STATE LAWS AGAINST ASSISTING IN A SUICIDE (2017), 
http://www.finalexitnetwork.org/Survey_of_State_Laws_Against_Assisting_in_a_Suicide
_2017_update.pdf. 
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B. The Modern Approach to Suicide-Related Crimes 
In the context of those who influence the commission of a 
suicide, it is difficult to draw a line between innocent and culpable 
conduct.55 “The boundaries between general advocacy for the right 
to suicide, encouraging suicide, and assisting suicide are extremely 
blurred, and conduct often does not fit neatly into just one 
category.”56 The following discussion will focus on potential 
classifications that suicide-related behaviors may fall into, 
including the encouragement of suicide.  
1. Assisting suicide 
The United States Supreme Court has held that “the asserted 
‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental 
liberty interest” under the Constitution.57 Thus, it is left to the states 
to decide whether to permit or prohibit an individual from assisting 
someone who wishes to die. On the whole, although there is 
dissonance as to what exactly qualifies as criminal “assistance,” 
most state laws explicitly forbid the act of assisting another 
individual in the commission of suicide.58  
a. Causing the suicide. Of all offenses pertaining to a person who 
has involved herself in another’s suicide, the highest degree of 
culpability lies with those who are found to have caused the suicide. 
The principal drafter of the Model Penal Code, Professor Herbert 
Wechsler, viewed the notion of causing suicide as “a pretty clever 
way to commit murder.”59 In fact, the Model Penal Code provides 
that “[a] person may be convicted of criminal homicide for causing 
 
 55. See Sean Sweeney, Note, Deadly Speech: Encouraging Suicide and Problematic 
Prosecutions, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 941, 948 (2017). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (“The history of the law’s 
treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection 
of nearly all efforts to permit it.”). 
 58. 96 Am. L. Rep. 6th 475 (2014). Forty states currently have assisted-suicide laws, 
although it is important to note, for purposes of this Note, that Massachusetts does not have 
any current legislation prohibiting the assistance or encouragement of suicide. See Susan 
Zalkind, Is Telling Someone to Commit Suicide a Crime?, VICE (Sep. 2, 2015), https://www. 
vice.com/en_us/article/wd7gx5/is-telling-someone-to-commit-suicide-a-crime-902. 
 59. Catherine D. Shaffer, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 
364 (1986) (quoting Continuation of Discussion of Model Penal Code, 36 A.L.I. PROC. 137 (1959)). 
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another to commit suicide . . . if he purposely causes such suicide 
by force, duress or deception.”60 
There are many cases where a defendant is charged with 
murder after physically killing the suicidal victim at the request of 
the decedent.61 But the law does not necessarily require that the 
defendant commit the actual act in order to find that the defendant 
is guilty as the cause of the suicide. In State v. Lassiter,62 the victim 
worked as a prostitute for the defendant who had physically 
abused her on multiple occasions.63 During one such incident, the 
defendant savagely beat the victim, despite her screams for help.64 
Eventually, she cried out that “she was going to jump,” because she 
could not take any more abuse.65 The defendant allegedly told her 
to “go ahead and jump.”66 The victim responded by throwing 
herself out the window of the apartment building, falling to  
her death.67 
The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of murder.68 The 
court found that the victim’s response to the defendant’s actions 
was reasonably foreseeable, and that the defendant was certainly 
the but-for cause of the victim’s death.69 “[I]n [the victim’s] despair 
and pain the only visible choices were between being beaten to 
death and a swifter, more merciful demise at her own hands.”70 The 
court also found that the defendant’s actions constituted causing 
suicide, rather than the less culpable offense of aiding suicide: the 
victim’s suicide “was provoked entirely by abuse and coercion on 
the part of the defendant,” and was not the result of a “suicidal plan 
originated with the victim.”71 
 
 60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 61. See, e.g., People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505, 507–08, 513 (Cal. 1959) (holding that the 
evidence strongly supported that the defendant was guilty of second degree murder where 
the defendant strangled a man to death allegedly at the decedent’s request, but remanding 
for a new trial on other grounds). 
 62. See generally State v. Lassiter, 484 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). 
 63. Id. at 15–16. 
 64. Id. at 16. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 18–19. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 19. 
 71. Id. 
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 (1) Causation based on non-physical influence. This Note 
focuses more on the potential criminality of causing suicide 
through words or psychological distress, as the court in Carter 
found that Michelle Carter did, rather than causing suicide through 
physical force or duress.  
 In theory, it is possible for causation of suicide to be established 
based on such psychological harm. One of the closest cases to this 
kind of causation is Kimberlin v. DeLong.72 In this case, the defendant 
placed a homemade explosive device in an abandoned gym bag.73 
The explosive detonated and severely injured a man walking by, 
resulting in the amputation of his leg.74 Over time, the victim 
became depressed and, more than four years after the explosion, 
committed suicide.75 Despite the fact that it had been years since the 
defendant’s criminal act, the court held that the suicide was not an 
intervening cause.76 The defendant remained liable for the 
wrongful death of the victim.77 Specifically, the court found that a 
defendant may be held responsible for any injury or death resulting 
from a suicide or suicide attempt “where a defendant’s willful 
tortious conduct was intended to cause a victim physical harm and 
where the intentional tort is a substantial factor in bringing about 
the suicide.”78 
Thus, Kimberlin illustrates that a defendant who is responsible 
for substantial psychological distress to a victim can be the cause of 
that victim’s suicide. However, Kimberlin also indicates that some 
physical action, like the bombing, is likely still needed to reach this 
conclusion. In fact, many similar suicide cases illustrate that mere 
psychological compulsion of a victim to commit suicide, without 
more, does not qualify as causation.79 For instance, in Turcios v. 
Debruler Co., the defendant forced the victim and the victim’s family 
out of their apartment and demolished the building.80 The court 
found that the resulting suicide was not foreseeable as a likely 
 
 72. See generally Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1994). 
 73. Id. at 123. 
 74. Id. at 123, 128. 
 75. Id. at 121. 
 76. Id. at 128. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Turcios v. Debruler Co., 32 N.E.3d 1117, 1128 (Ill. 2015). 
 80. Id. at 1121, 1128. 
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result of the eviction, because “suicide may result from a complex 
combination of psychological, psychiatric, chemical, emotional, 
and environmental factors.”81 Overall, it is a “rare case in which the 
decedent’s suicide would not break the chain of causation,” even 
under circumstances where a defendant causes severe emotional or 
psychological distress.82 
Additionally, the aforementioned cases were civil claims, 
demonstrating that causing psychological distress which results in 
a suicide is not generally criminally punishable. Courts are not 
likely to establish that a defendant has caused a suicide without 
some element of physical coercion or actual action on the part of 
the defendant. 
b. Active facilitation of the suicide. Physically assisting a suicide 
can result in a criminal conviction, depending on the jurisdiction. 
Criminal assistance charges range from actions as involved as 
strangling a victim to death at the victim’s own request,83 to more 
trivial forms of help, such as addressing the envelopes for the 
victim’s suicide notes.84  
Many courts have also found it to be a crime when the 
defendant simply provided the means for a victim to commit 
suicide.85 On the other hand, some courts have reached the opposite 
conclusion.86 For example, one defendant in Michigan encouraged 
a suicidal acquaintance to purchase a gun, drove the victim to 
retrieve a weapon and shells from another home, and then left the 
victim alone with the gun to kill himself.87 The court found that “the 
 
 81. Id. at 1128. 
 82. Id. In Turcios, it is also significant that the victim’s psychological distress resulted 
from the defendant’s physical action of demolishing the victim’s home, which was still not 
enough to establish causation of the suicide. Id. 
 83. See People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1959). 
 84. A grand jury in Texas indicted a teenage girl for aiding her boyfriend’s suicide 
simply because she addressed the envelopes for his suicide notes. AP, Texan Accused of  
Aiding Boyfriend’s Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/ 
11/27/us/texan-accused-of-aiding-boyfriend-s-suicide.html. 
 85. See State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 583 (Iowa 1980) (holding that “preparing and 
providing a weapon for one who is unable to do so and is known to be intoxicated and 
probably suicidal” constitute actions that support the defendant’s conviction of involuntary 
manslaughter); see also State v. Bier, 591 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Mont. 1979) (affirming a judgment 
of negligent homicide for a defendant’s wife’s suicide, where the defendant “threw [a] 
cocked, loaded firearm within reach of his intoxicated wife, challenged her to use it, and 
allowed her to take the gun off the bed”). 
 86. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
 87. Id. at 28–29. 
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conduct of the defendant [was] morally reprehensible,” but, even 
with the additional action of providing the suicide victim with a 
weapon, inciting someone to commit suicide was not in itself  
a crime.88 
c. Passive assistance of the suicide. In theory, a defendant can be 
convicted for assisting a suicide after simply standing by and 
failing to prevent it.89 This is particularly true where the defendant 
owes the victim a special duty, such as in a spousal relationship.90 
However, this seems to be a predominately hypothetical view on 
suicide liability. More relevant for purposes of this Note is that 
mere verbal communication can establish criminal liability for 
passive suicidal assistance, so long as those words offer  
material assistance specific to the suicide in question.91 Minnesota 
in particular has dealt with this issue. Its courts have  
interpreted statutory criminal assistance of suicide to include 
“either physical conduct or words . . . specifically directed at [the 
victim],” so long as “the conduct or words enabled [the victim] to 
take her own  life.”92 In fact, a Minnesota defendant was recently 
found guilty of assisting a suicide after providing detailed 
instructions for a particular method of hanging oneself to a suicidal 
internet correspondent.93 
d. Physician-assisted suicide. One topic that has gained particular 
prevalence and notoriety in the media and within the field of law is 
that of physician-assisted suicide. Dr. Jack Kevorkian, the 
pathologist also known as “Dr. Death,”94 was perhaps the most 
famous influence behind the movement endorsing the right for the 
 
 88. Id. at 31. 
 89. Shaffer, supra note 59, at 358–59. 
 90. Id. 
 91. The Minnesota Supreme Court has found that speech that goes “beyond merely 
expressing a moral viewpoint or providing a general comfort or support” for suicide and 
instead “enabl[es] the person to commit suicide” qualifies as criminal assistance of suicide. 
State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014); see also infra Section III.A.3. 
 92. State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296, 304 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) 
(holding that the district court’s jury instructions were proper when the instructions defined 
the assisting of suicide to include words) (emphasis added); see also Melchert-Dinkel, 844 
N.W.2d at 23. 
 93. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. A15-0073, 2015 WL 9437531, at *5–9 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Dec. 28, 2015). 
 94. Dominic Rushe, ‘Dr Death’ Jack Kevorkian, Advocate of Assisted Suicide, Dies in 
Hospital, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/04/ 
dr-death-jack-kevorkian-suicide. 
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terminally ill to plan their own suicides through medical means. Dr. 
Kevorkian built a machine, which he operated out of a Volkswagen 
van, that injected a lethal dose of medication to those who wished 
to die.95 He helped end the lives of approximately 130 ill patients.96 
After broadcasting one such death on 60 Minutes, one of the most 
popular programs on American television, Dr. Kevorkian was 
convicted of second-degree murder and spent eight years  
in prison.97 
While Dr. Kevorkian’s story and methods were controversial,98 
his actions sparked a national debate about what kind of death 
suffering humans are entitled to receive. In the last twenty years, 
nine states, as well as the District of Columbia, have approved of 
physician-assisted suicide through either statutory law or court 
decision.99 There are also nineteen additional states currently 
considering such a statute.100 The vast majority of jurisdictions still 
hold all forms of assisted suicide to be illegal. But the ongoing 
physician-assisted suicide debate reflects a modern shift in 
attitudes toward suicide,101 as well as toward those who aid 
suffering individuals with a legitimate desire to initiate their  
own deaths. 
2. Suicide pacts 
Another area of suicide law revolves around the curious 
phenomenon of the suicide pact, defined as a mutual agreement 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Keith Schneider, Dr. Jack Kevorkian Dies at 83; A Doctor Who Helped End Lives, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/us/04kevorkian.html. 
 97. Rushe, supra note 94. 
 98. For instance, the American Medical Association publicly labeled Jack Kevorkian 
“a reckless instrument of death,” who “pervert[ed] the idea of the caring and committed 
physician,” and whose ideologies and actions “pose[d] a great threat to the public.” 
Kevorkian v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 602 N.W. 233, 235 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
 99. See Take Action, supra note 52. Apart from the District of Columbia, the nine U.S. 
jurisdictions that have enacted Death with Dignity laws through statute or by court decision 
include California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington. Id. 
 100. Id. The following states are considering the enactment of a Death with Dignity law 
this year or session: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 101. See generally supra Section I.A. 
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among two or more people to commit suicide together.102 
Participating in a suicide pact creates a tricky question of 
culpability in the United States. In part, such participation is 
suicide, which is not illegal; nevertheless, the participation is also 
partially assisting suicide, which many jurisdictions deem 
criminal.103 Thus, the defendant seems both simultaneously guilty 
as a potential cause of suicide, and innocent as a potential victim  
of suicide. 
Under traditional common law, a survivor of a suicide pact was 
held to be guilty of murder.104 However, the modern trend 
recognizes that criminal punishment does not offer solutions for 
those in the frame of mind to attempt suicide.105 Some jurisdictions 
have abolished liability entirely for survivors of suicide pacts.106 
Others have elected to lessen the criminal culpability for 
participants in suicide pacts “in which one party provides the 
means but each individual kills himself independently pursuant to 
the agreement, or where the pact envisions both parties killing 
themselves simultaneously with a single instrumentality,” finding 
the survivors liable as mere aiders and abettors to the suicide.107 
3. Encouraging suicide 
This final category presents the overarching question that 
resides at the heart of this Note—whether the mere encouragement 
of suicide is illegal. For purposes of this Note, “encouraging” 
 
 102. Suicide Pact, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969). 
 103. See Diana M. Keating, Existence of a Suicide Pact as a Complete Defense to a Survivor’s 
Criminal Liability, 21 AKRON L. REV. 245, 250 (1987). 
 104. 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 14 (2018). 
 105. See David S. Markson, The Punishment of Suicide—A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. 
REV. 463, 473 (1969) (“All modern research points to one conclusion about the problem of 
suicide—the irrelevance of the criminal law to its solution.”). 
 106. See State v. Sage, 510 N.E.2d 343, 345–48 (Ohio 1987) (finding that “if the trier of 
fact believe[s] defendant’s version of the facts . . . [t]he assertion that a death was the result 
of a mutual suicide pact is a complete defense to any crime by the survivor to the pact” 
(emphasis added)). 
 107. 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 14 (2018); see also In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176 (Cal. 1983). In this 
case, a sixteen-year-old and his friend agreed to drive off a cliff together in an attempt to kill 
themselves. Id. at 1177. While the passenger died, the driver of the car survived with severe 
injuries. Id. at 1177–78. The court found that the survivor was only guilty under the felony of 
aiding suicide, and not under the traditional charge of murder associated with suicide pacts, 
because both the victim and the survivor had “commit[ted] their suicidal acts simultaneously 
and were subject to identical risks of death.” Id. at 1182–83. 
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suicide pertains to verbal or written statements made with the 
intent to persuade or embolden another individual to commit 
suicide.108 There are jurisdictions that specifically criminalize the 
encouragement of suicide.109 However, those states are relatively 
few in number, and “many states have moved away from broad 
prohibitions on ‘encouraging’ or ‘advising’ someone to commit 
suicide and now explicitly require some physical act beyond  
pure speech.”110 
Overall, the vast majority of jurisdictions are uncomfortable 
with actually prosecuting the encouragement of suicide.111 The 
modern trend is that, in most cases, courts generally look for some 
form of assistance to accompany the defendant’s encouragement of 
the suicide in order to convict that individual.112 This is perhaps 
why Michelle Carter’s story is of such particular fascination to  
the public. Carter’s case exhibits a conviction based on a  
seemingly archaic and outdated rule—guilt for mere suicide 
encouragement—which resulted from the use of very modern 
technology—Carter’s mobile phone. 
II. MICHELLE CARTER’S CURIOUS VERDICT 
This Part examines how the assistance or encouragement of 
suicide fits within the scope of Massachusetts criminal law. The 
discussion then moves on to examine the court’s reasoning in 
Michelle Carter’s case. It concludes that in the absence of statutory 
guidance the court overstepped its boundaries by finding Michelle 
Carter guilty of involuntary manslaughter.   
 
 108. See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014) (finding that “the 
common definitions of ‘advise’ and ‘encourage’ broadly include speech that provides 
support or rallies courage”). 
 109. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2010); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (2016); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 813 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
16-37 (2006). These statutes are all similarly worded, broadly making it a crime to in any way 
“advise” or “encourage” another to commit suicide. 
 110. Ready, supra note 48, at 130. 
 111. This is evidenced by the fact that only five states have enacted statutes prohibiting 
suicide encouragement. See Markson, supra note 109. 
 112. See Assisted Suicide Laws in the United States, PATIENTS RIGHTS COUNCIL, 
http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/assisted-suicide-state-laws/ (last updated Jan. 
6, 2017); see, e.g., People v. Duffy, 595 N.E.2d 814 (N.Y. 1992). The court in this case found the 
defendant guilty for bringing out a gun and handing the weapon to a suicidal minor, 
challenging the youth to shoot himself, because it is reckless for “a person who, knowing 
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A. Involuntary Manslaughter Under Massachusetts Law 
Because Massachusetts has no statute criminalizing the 
assistance or encouragement of suicide, the state’s courts generally 
choose to analyze cases such as Michelle Carter’s under a theory of 
involuntary manslaughter. Under Massachusetts common law,113 
“[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is an unlawful homicide 
unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such a disregard 
of probable harmful consequences to another as to amount to 
wanton or reckless conduct.”114 Conduct is wanton or reckless 
when it is intentional and highly likely to result in substantial harm 
to another.115 Culpable conduct stems from what the defendant 
knew, or what a reasonable person should have known, under the 
same circumstances.116 Wantonness or recklessness can be 
established by either an intentional act or an intentional omission 
where the defendant has a duty to act.117 While, generally, “one 
does not have a duty to take affirmative action, . . . a duty to prevent 
harm . . . arises when one creates a dangerous situation.”118 Thus, in 
Michelle Carter’s case, the prosecution bore the burden of proving 
 
that another is contemplating immediate suicide, deliberately prods that person to go 
forward and furnishes the means of bringing about death.” Id. at 815. While assisted suicide 
statutes are more common, it should also be noted that many governments “appear to be 
reluctant” to prosecute suicide assistance, not just cases of suicide encouragement, and 
“assistance statutes are seldom enforced.” Shaffer, supra note 59, at 370–71. Despite high 
numbers of annual suicides in America, only a handful of cases involving assisted suicide 
are nationally reported each year. Id. 
 113. Massachusetts has no statute addressing involuntary manslaughter. See 
Commonwealth v. Godin, 371 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Mass. 1975) (“There is no statutory definition 
of manslaughter. The elements of the crime are derived from the common law.”). 
 114. Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 328 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. 1975). 
 115. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944). 
 116. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1060 (Mass. 2016) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 672 (Mass. 2012)). 
 117. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d at 685. For an example of an intentional act resulting in 
involuntary manslaughter, see Commonwealth v. Walker, 812 N.E.2d 262, 270–71 (Mass. 
2004), where the court affirmed a conviction of involuntary manslaughter against a 
defendant who attempted to drug a victim by providing the victim with an alcoholic drink 
mixed with sleeping pills. For an example of a conviction of involuntary manslaughter for 
an omission to act, see Commonwealth v. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2002). In this case, 
the court found that defendants who started a fire and simply allowed it to burn may have 
had a duty to “tak[e] adequate steps either to control [the fire] or to report it to the proper 
authorities.” Id. at 57. 
 118. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d at 56 (emphasis added). 
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that Carter’s conduct “(1) was intentional; (2) was wanton or 
reckless; and (3) caused the victim’s death.”119 
B. The Court’s Reasoning in Carter 
In Michelle Carter’s case, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
identified the principal question to be whether an individual can be 
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter “where the defendant’s 
conduct did not extend beyond words.”120 Carter asserted that her 
conduct could not be wanton or reckless because she was not 
physically present at Roy’s suicide and the fact that she provided 
no physical assistance whatsoever.121 In other words, Carter argued 
“that verbal conduct can never overcome a person’s willpower to 
live, and therefore cannot be the cause of a suicide.”122 The court 
disagreed, finding that no cases in Massachusetts explicitly require 
physical action to indict someone for involuntary manslaughter.123 
Further, the court found that Carter’s constant communication with 
the victim through text messages and phone conversations 
constituted a “virtual” presence.124 Ultimately, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court affirmed Michelle Carter’s indictment for 
involuntary manslaughter.125 
Perhaps the most curious aspect of the 2016 Carter holding, as 
well as the later verdict by Judge Moniz in 2017, is the emphasis 
placed on three words uttered by Carter over the phone before Roy 
died: “Get back in.”126 The court found that the “coercive quality of 
that final directive” overcame the victim’s willpower, which led to 
Roy “obey[ing] [Carter], returning to the truck, closing the door, 
and succumbing to the carbon monoxide.”127  
In fact, the court found that there was sufficient evidence of 
probable cause that Carter caused Roy’s death because “but for the 
defendant’s admonishments, pressure, and instructions, the victim 
would not have gotten back into the truck and poisoned himself to 
 
 119. Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1061 (footnote omitted). 
 120. Id. at 1056. 
 121. Id. at 1061. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1061 n.13. 
 125. Id. at 1056 (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. at 1063; Glaun, supra note 22. 
 127. Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1063. 
006.TAYLOR_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:52 PM 
613 Kill Me Through the Phone 
 631 
 
death.”128 Similarly, in the 2017 verdict, Judge Moniz found that 
Carter’s command to return to the truck created the  
circumstances that led to Roy’s death.129 Because of this, Carter 
owed her dying boyfriend a duty to at least attempt to save his 
life.130 Specifically, “[Carter’s] failure to act, where she had a self-
created duty to Mr. Roy since she had put him into that toxic 
environment, constituted . . . wanton and reckless conduct” under 
Massachusetts’ involuntary manslaughter law.131 
In these rulings, no mention is made of Carter potentially 
assisting Roy’s suicide—only that she encouraged and caused it.132 
It is troubling that three words spoken over the phone, combined 
with a bundle of text messages, are enough to establish causation 
on par with other suicide cases, such as when causation was 
established after a man physically beat his victim to the point that 
she threw herself out of a window.133 These other cases indicate that 
the focus of criminal liability within suicide law leans more heavily 
on whether mens rea exists, rather than looking to the actus reus of 
the crime. In Michelle Carter’s case, the court seems to reason that 
Carter’s instruction to “get back in” the truck established  
elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, 
Carter’s conduct was intentional, was wanton or reckless, and 
caused Roy’s death.134  
However, these three words alone still seem to be feeble 
grounds upon which to base a finding that a defendant created the 
circumstances for a suicide. This contention is bolstered by the fact 
that Michelle Carter’s communications with Roy leading up to his 
death came only by faceless, electronic means.135 Without any 
statutory law to support a criminal conviction for Carter, the court’s 
decision exhibits a form of lawmaking from the bench that exceeds 
the judiciary’s role in American democracy.  
 
 128. Id. at 1064. 
 129. Glaun, supra note 22. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See generally Carter, 52 N.E.3d; Glaun, supra note 22. 
 133. See generally State v. Lassiter, 484 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); see also 
supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
 134. Glaun, supra note 22. 
 135. See Carter, 52 N.E.3d at 1057. 
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III. HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS IMPACTED SUICIDE LAW 
This Part explores how, if at all, modern technology has 
transformed the way the law treats both suicide and those who 
assist or encourage its commission. Since the advent of mobile 
telephones and the World Wide Web, digital technology has been 
a pervasive and omnipresent part of life in the United States. Recent 
studies show that roughly nine out of ten Americans use the 
Internet, which is a significant increase from the five out of ten 
Americans who were online in 2000.136 Going further, more than 
seventy percent of the American public use at least one social media 
site.137 As far as mobile phone usage is concerned, ninety-six 
percent of the United States population owns a cellphone of some 
kind.138 Eighty-one percent of Americans own a smartphone.139 Of 
that number, ninety-seven percent of smartphone owners text on a 
regular basis.140 
In other words, the Internet and mobile technology dominate 
the average American’s day-to-day life. The following discussion 
examines current case law and legislation, arguing that the criminal 
potential for encouraging suicide has changed with the 
development of new technologies. 
A. Modern Cases Similar in Nature to Commonwealth v. Carter 
1. United States v. Drew 
United States v. Drew is one of the most notorious cases relating 
to suicide and modern technology.141 This case began in Missouri 
with a mother, Lori Drew, who set up a fake profile on MySpace.142 
Drew impersonated a sixteen-year-old boy in order to target 
thirteen-year-old Megan Meier, who was a classmate of Drew’s 
 
 136. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewinternet. 
org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ (last updated June 12, 2019). 
 137. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www. 
pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ (last updated June 12, 2019). 
 138. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/ (last updated June 12, 2019). 
 139. Id.   
 140. See U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 2015) http://www. 
pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/. 
 141. See generally United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 142. Id. at 452. 
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daughter.143 Masquerading as a teenager, Drew began to flirt with 
Megan on MySpace and then turned against her, eventually telling 
Megan that “the world would be a better place without her in it.”144 
That same day, Megan ended her own life.145 
The interesting aspect of this case is that the prosecution did not 
charge Drew under any kind of bullying, harassment, or suicide 
laws. This is, in large part, because no Missouri law substantially 
addressed this kind of online conduct.146 In fact, Missouri 
prosecutors refused to file charges against Lori Drew because “the 
case did not fit into any law.”147 Instead, the federal government 
rather unconventionally pursued claims alleging that Drew had 
violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).148 Drew was 
ultimately not convicted under the CFAA.149 This rendered Drew a 
prime example of attorneys admirably, but futilely, attempting to 
conform a law to the facts of a case in the absence of an appropriate 
statute. In response to Drew, Missouri legislators amended the 
state’s laws to include penalties for bullying and harassment 
specifically through electronic communications.150 
Applying this case to Carter, it is unprogressive for 
Massachusetts to continue relying on common law involuntary 
manslaughter theories to convict defendants for another’s 
suicide.151 In the wake of Drew, the Missouri legislators promptly 
responded to address the criminality of certain behaviors 
conducted through electronic communications. Likewise, the 
lawmakers in Massachusetts should also break the silence as to 
whether encouraging or assisting suicide through electronic 
communications can be illegal. The legislature should not leave the 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Prosecutor: No Criminal Charges in MySpace Suicide, FOX NEWS (Dec. 3, 2007), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/03/prosecutor-no-criminal-charges-in-
myspace-suicide.html. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 451. 
 149. See id. at 468. 
 150. See S.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008), http://www. 
senate.mo.gov/08 info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=147; see also Associated 
Press, Missouri Passes Cyber-Bullying Bill, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2008), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2008/may/17/nation/na-suicide17. 
 151. While Massachusetts has no statutory suicide laws, it does have a cyberbullying 
statute. See S.B. 2323, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009). 
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courts to work this out on their own without any guidance. Doing 
so forces the courts to inappropriately stretch potentially outdated 
common law to fit this modern scenario. 
As a side note, the Drew case brings the issue of cyberbullying 
into the discussion of suicide law. While this Note does not focus 
on cyberbullying, it should be noted that, since the advent of the 
Internet, cell phones, and social media networks, cyberbullying has 
become a growing concern, particularly for minors.152 However, 
Michelle Carter’s conduct does not fall under the umbrella of 
typical cyberbullying. While cyberbullying is important in the 
context of technology and suicide, it does not speak to the narrower 
issue of suicide encouragement that surrounds Michelle Carter, 
other than to raise potential concerns as to whether the outcome of 
Carter could create higher culpability for cyberbullies who cruelly, 
but likely not in actual seriousness, instruct their victims to “kill 
themselves” or “jump off a bridge.”153 
2. Suzanne Gonzales 
 While cyberbullying is perhaps the most obvious problem that 
encompasses technology and suicide, web-assisted suicides are 
also a troubling concept. Web-assisted suicides result from online 
forums that encourage suicide and share tips on how to kill oneself. 
Unsurprisingly, websites like this lend themselves to tragic results, 
such as in the case of Suzanne Gonzales.154 Gonzales was a college 
student who discovered a popular online suicide newsgroup called 
Alt.Suicide.Holiday, or ASH.155 After finding this website, 
Gonzales posted more than 100 messages in the weeks leading up 
 
 152. Studies conducted by the Cyberbullying Research Center indicate that 
cyberbullying victims in middle and high schools have been increasing in numbers over the 
past decade across the United States. See Justin W. Patchin, Summary of Our Cyberbullying 
Research (2004–2016), CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (Nov. 26, 2016), https://cyberbullying.org/ 
summary-of-our-cyberbullying-research. 
 153. See infra Part IV for a discussion of these concerns and other potential ramifications 
of Carter. 
 154. See generally Thelma Gutierrez & Kim McCabe, Parents: Online Newsgroup Helped 
Daughter Commit Suicide, CNN (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/11/ 
04/suicide.internet/index.html. 
 155. Id. 
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to her death.156 She gathered information from the site on how to 
illegally obtain potassium cyanide and how to mix it into a lethal 
poison.157 A member of ASH even helped Gonzales write her 
suicide note.158 
Gonzales’s story is certainly not the first of its kind,159 but her 
particular death inspired a reaction on a federal level.160 Suzy’s Law 
was proposed after Gonzales’s suicide as legislation that would 
prohibit groups like ASH from advising or teaching people how to 
commit suicide.161 However, Suzy’s Law has been introduced no 
less than three times since Gonzales’s death and has never 
passed.162 This failure to enact such legislation indicates that the 
federal government does not ultimately desire to ban discussion, 
encouragement, or instruction on suicide, either in person or 
through electronic communications. Applying this to the Carter 
case, it is evident that America’s federal lawmakers would rather 
preserve the freedom of speech and expression through electronic 
communications, than make conduct such as Michelle Carter’s into 
a federal crime.163 
3. State v. Melchert-Dinkel 
In one recent and particularly relevant case, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court found that a state statute prohibiting the 
 
 156. Julia Scheeres, A Virtual Path to Suicide / Depressed Student Killed Herself with Help 
from Online Discussion Group, SFGATE (June 8, 2003), http://www.sfgate.com/ 
news/article/A-VIRTUAL-PATH-TO-SUICIDE-Depressed-student-2611315.php. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See, e.g., Point, Click and Die, NEWSWEEK (June 29, 2003), 
http://www.newsweek.com/point-click-and-die-138301 (detailing two stories—first, of a 
young woman who hung herself after finding detailed information about suicide by hanging 
online; and second, of a fifty-two-year-old woman who used helium gas to overdose after 
viewing a website that provided instructions on an effective method of suicide by helium); 
Ian Cobain, Clampdown on Chatrooms After Two Strangers Die in First Internet Death Pact, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2005), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/oct/11/socialcare. 
technology (discussing the new trend of “suicide chat rooms,” which allow users to 
encourage and even instruct other users on suicide methods); Jonathan Owen, Teens Die After 
Logging into ‘Suicide Chat Rooms’, INDEPENDENT (Sep. 10, 2006), http://www.independent. 
co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/teens-die-after-logging-into-suicide-chat-rooms-415386.html 
(“Pro-suicide websites and chat rooms have been implicated in the deaths of at least 16 
young people in the UK in the past few years.”). 
 160. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 968. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 968–69. 
 163. See also infra Section V.A. 
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encouragement of suicide was unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.164 In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the defendant posed 
online as a nurse.165 He responded to various posts on suicide 
websites.166 He eventually succeeded in persuading two 
individuals to kill themselves.167 Melchert-Dinkel offered his 
victims sympathy and reassurance in their online conversations, 
while also describing methods of how to commit suicide by 
hanging.168 After his actions were discovered, Melchert-Dinkel was 
initially convicted on two counts of encouraging suicide under a 
Minnesota statute.169 The statute provided that anyone who 
“intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another in taking the 
other’s own life” was subject to criminal punishment.170 
On appeal, the court found that the inclusion of both “advises” 
and “encourages” in the statute was unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment because this language “broadly include[s] speech 
that provides support or rallies courage,” and neither advising nor 
encouraging suicide automatically carries a causal connection with 
the suicide.171 However, the court also held that the statute was 
severable and that assisting a suicide was still illegal under 
Minnesota law.172 Further, the court found that, while encouraging 
and advising suicide is protected by the First Amendment, mere 
words could still constitute criminal assistance under the 
Minnesota statute if a direct, causal link existed between the speech 
and the suicide.173 The court reasoned: 
 
 164. See generally State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014). 
 165. Id. at 16–17. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 17–19. 
 170. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1998); see also Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 17–
19. 
 171. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 23. 
 172. Id. at 23–24. 
 173. Id. at 23. 
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[Assistance] . . . proscribes speech or conduct that provides 
another person with what is needed for the person to commit 
suicide. This signifies a level of involvement in the suicide beyond 
merely expressing a moral viewpoint or providing general 
comfort or support. Rather, “assist,” by its plain meaning, 
involves enabling the person to commit suicide. While 
enablement perhaps most obviously occurs in the context of 
physical assistance, speech alone may also enable a person to commit 
suicide. Here, we need only note that speech instructing another 
on suicide methods falls within the ambit of constitutional 
limitations on speech that assists another in committing suicide.174 
The court ultimately reversed and remanded Melchert-Dinkel’s 
case to be viewed in light of Minnesota’s revised statute with the 
words “advis[ing]” and “encourag[ing]” removed.175 Interestingly, 
Melchert-Dinkel was still convicted on remand for one count of 
“assisting” suicide because Melchert-Dinkel provided very specific 
instructions for a hanging method.176 The court found this qualified 
as “assistance” because one of his victims chose to hang himself.177 
Applying this case to the issues raised by Carter leads to some 
compelling discussion. The holding in Melchert-Dinkel indicates 
that the court’s reasoning for convicting Michelle Carter of 
manslaughter—Carter’s insistence that her boyfriend “get back in” 
the truck—would be a violation of the First Amendment because 
those three words merely constituted encouragement. On the other 
hand, if Massachusetts were to enact an assisted suicide statute, 
Michelle Carter’s text messages and phone conversations with Roy 
could, under the court’s analysis in Melchert-Dinkel, make her liable 
for assisting Roy’s suicide: Carter gave Roy advice about 
committing suicide through carbon monoxide poisoning.178 Thus, 
 
 174. Id. (emphasis added). 
 175. Id. at 24–25. 
 176. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. A15-0073, 2015 WL 9437531, at *5–9 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Read Text Messages, Other Evidence from the Trial of Michelle Carter, WCVB  
(June 13, 2017), http://www.wcvb.com/article/evidence-from-the-trial-of-michelle-carter/ 
10011731 [https://htv-prod-media.s3.amazonaws.com/files/carter-exhibit-30-1497356322. 
pdf]. For instance, in planning the suicide via text together, Carter texted Roy that, 
“generators produce a lot of CO, so if you just turn it on in your car, take some beneryls [sic] 
before just incase, [sic] and then you’ll breathe it in and pass out and die very quickly and 
peacefully with no pain at all.” Id. However, while there are numerous instances of Carter 
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Carter’s words may actually have crossed the bridge from mere 
encouragement to assistance under the Melchert-Dinkel standard 
because she gave her boyfriend significant advice pertaining to 
carbon monoxide poisoning. However, in the absence of statutory 
law, the Carter court overreached in using common law to hold 
Michelle Carter guilty based on words alone.  
B. Physical Versus Virtual Presence 
One of Michelle Carter’s main arguments was that her conduct 
could not qualify as involuntary manslaughter because she was not 
“physically present when the victim killed himself.”179 The court 
responded that nothing in Massachusetts’ case law requires that the 
defendant be physically present in order to establish involuntary 
manslaughter.180 However, the court also neglected to mention that 
all similar suicide cases in Massachusetts involved a defendant who 
was physically present at the time of the victim’s death. 
1. Examples in Massachusetts case law of encouraging suicide 
The laws behind the encouragement of suicide in 
Massachusetts stretch back more than 200 years to the 1816 case of 
Commonwealth v. Bowen.181 George Bowen was a prisoner on trial for 
murder after successfully encouraging Jonathan Jewett, a fellow 
inmate, to hang himself the night before Jewett’s scheduled 
execution.182 The court held that the most vital fact to examine was 
whether Bowen was “instrumental in the death of Jewett, by advice 
or otherwise.”183 The central question for the jury was: “Did 
[Bowen’s] advice procure the death of Jewett?”184 The 
Commonwealth presented evidence that Bowen had consistently 
 
giving Roy such general advice, it would be difficult to prove that she assisted Roy’s suicide 
because her texts arguably did not give Roy specific or detailed instructions as to how to 
commit suicide. Id. 
 179. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1061 (Mass. 2016). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See generally Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816). 
 182. Id. at 356. 
 183. Id. at 359. 
 184. Id. (emphasis added). 
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urged Jewett to take his death into his own hands.185 Speaking to 
the jury, the court stated: 
[I]t is in man’s nature to revolt at the idea of self-destruction. 
Where a person is predetermined upon the commission of this 
crime, the seasonable admonitions of a discreet and respected 
friend would probably tend to overthrow his determination. On 
the other hand, the counsel of an unprincipled wretch, stating the 
heroism and courage the self-murderer displays, might induce, 
encourage, and fix the intention, and ultimately procure the 
perpetration of the dreadful deed. And, if other men would be 
influenced by such advice, the presumption is, that Jewett was so 
influenced. He might have been influenced by many powerful 
motives to destroy himself. Still, the inducements might have 
been insufficient to procure the actual commission of the act, and 
one word of additional advice might have turned the scale. 
If you are satisfied that Jewett, previously to any acquaintance or 
conversation with the prisoner, had determined within himself 
that his own hand should terminate his existence, and that he 
esteemed the conversation with the prisoner, so far as it affected 
himself, as mere idle talk, let your verdict say so. But, if you find 
the prisoner encouraged and kept alive motives previously 
existing in Jewett’s mind, and suggested others to augment their 
influence, you will decide accordingly. 
. . . [T]here is no period of human life which is not precious as a 
season of repentance. The culprit, though under sentence of 
death, is cheered by hope to the last moment of his existence.186  
Ultimately, the jury in Bowen returned a verdict of not guilty.187 
The jury found that Bowen’s encouragement was not the procuring 
cause of Jewett’s suicide.188 This case set a significant precedent in 
Massachusetts that “the state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the suicide counselor actually ‘procured’ or was 
responsible for the act itself.”189 Additionally, it is of import to note 
that Bowen’s cell was directly adjacent to Jewett’s cell, which 
placed the two men “in such a situation that they could freely 
 
 185. Jack Tager, “Murder by Counseling”: The 1816 Case of George Bowen (Northampton), 
38 HIST. J. MASS. 102, 104 (2010). 
 186. Bowen, 13 Mass. at 359–60. 
 187. Id. at 360–61. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Tager, supra note 185. 
006.TAYLOR_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:52 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
640 
 
converse together” and where Bowen was able to “repeatedly and 
frequently advise[] and urge[] Jewett to destroy himself.”190 
Nevertheless, in spite of Bowen’s physical presence and proximity 
to the victim prior to Jewett’s suicide, the jury still refused to 
impose a guilty verdict.  
In Commonwealth v. Atencio, two defendants were found guilty 
of involuntary manslaughter under Massachusetts law after 
playing a game of “Russian roulette.”191 The two defendants had 
both taken turns pulling the trigger on a revolver containing only 
one cartridge, with no result.192 However, the game came to a tragic 
end when the third member of their party took his turn in the game, 
dying from a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head.193 The court 
found that “the concerted action and cooperation of the defendants 
in helping to bring about the deceased’s foolish act” qualified as 
wanton or reckless conduct.194 Notably, the court found that no 
duty existed for the defendants to prevent the third party from 
playing Russian roulette; however, the defendants’ “mutual 
encouragement in a joint enterprise” breached a duty “not to 
cooperate or join with him in the ‘game.’”195 
Similarly, in the case of Persampieri v. Commonwealth, the court 
affirmed a man’s involuntary manslaughter indictment for his 
wife’s self-induced death.196 The defendant had told his wife that 
he wished for a divorce.197 She responded by threatening to commit 
suicide.198 At this point, her husband claimed that she was too 
cowardly to go through with such an endeavor.199 He reminded her 
that she had failed to complete her attempted suicides on no less 
than two previous occasions.200 The defendant then instructed his 
wife to retrieve the rifle in the kitchen.201 She did so, and at her 
request, the defendant loaded the weapon for her, since she 
 
 190. Bowen, 13 Mass. at 356. 
 191. See generally Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963). 
 192. Id. at 224. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 225. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See generally Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961). 
 197. Id. at 389. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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struggled to load it herself.202 He then handed the rifle to his wife, 
noting that the safety was off.203 She placed the weapon on the floor 
between her legs, with the muzzle against her forehead, but was 
unable to reach the trigger in such a position.204 The defendant 
suggested that she remove her shoes in order to reach the trigger.205 
After removing one of her shoes, the rifle went off, and the 
defendant’s wife died.206 
The court found that the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently 
wanton or reckless to satisfy a conviction of involuntary 
manslaughter because:  
[I]nstead of trying to bring [his wife] to her senses, [the defendant] 
taunted her, told her where the gun was, loaded it for her, saw 
that the safety was off, and told her the means by which she could 
pull the trigger . . . thus show[ing] a reckless disregard of his 
wife’s safety and the possible consequences of his conduct.207 
The cases of Bowen, Atencio, and Persampieri all have one crucial 
element in common. In these three cases, all of which were relied 
on by the court in Carter or by the court in Michelle Carter’s 2017 
verdict, the defendants had some kind of physical presence at the 
time of each respective decedents’ suicides. What is more, the 
defendant in Persampieri actually physically assisted his wife with 
her suicide. Thus, while the Carter court was correct that 
Massachusetts common law for involuntary manslaughter does not 
explicitly require a physical presence, the cases where a 
Massachusetts defendant was convicted for involuntary 
manslaughter after encouraging or assisting a suicide all strongly 
imply a physical presence requirement. 
2. Virtual presence 
One could argue that if a physical presence was necessary to 
convict Michelle Carter, she still qualifies due to her virtual 
presence. Indeed, the court in Carter held that, “[a]lthough not 
physically present when the victim committed suicide, the constant 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 390. 
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communication with him by text message and by telephone leading 
up to and during the suicide made the defendant’s presence at  
least virtual.”208 
This raises the key question as to whether such a virtual 
presence can be equated with an actual presence. On the one hand, 
courts have held that, for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a 
virtual presence is not equivalent to a physical presence.209 On the 
other hand, in the context of defamation, courts have found that an 
online presence is just as important, or “perhaps more important,” 
than a person’s physical presence.210  
Even more concerning than the finding that virtual presence 
can be more important than physical presence is the line-drawing 
issue. This issue may come into play when courts consider whether 
all virtual presences are equal for suicide encouragement, or if 
some virtual presences should be labeled as more culpable than 
others. For instance, it is unclear where the greatest liability lies for 
an individual having a conversation with a suicidal acquaintance. 
There are myriad ways to communicate with others in the digital 
age. It will be left to the courts to decide whether texts, phone calls, 
Skype conversations, tweets, and YouTube comments will weigh 
equally on the scale of blameworthiness under modern suicide  
law. Overall, this area of the law is ambiguous. For that reason, in 
the context of suicide law, the court’s decision in Carter to 
offhandedly equate a virtual presence with a physical presence 
lacks any settled precedent. 
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
While Michelle Carter’s case is certainly not binding in federal 
court or in other state jurisdictions, it has been widely publicized 
on a national level.211 If other courts find this case persuasive in the 
future, it could have troubling ramifications in the realm of suicide 
 
 208. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1061 n.13 (Mass. 2016). 
 209. State v. Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d 495, 504 (Iowa 2014) (finding that two-way 
videoconferencing technology does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment because “[t]echnology 
has changed since the late eighteenth century, but human nature has not,” and “no form of 
virtual testimony can fully satisfy” the experience of in-person encounters). 
 210. Bouveng v. NYG Capital LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 280, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 211. See, e.g., Kalhan Rosenblatt, Suicide Case, Sentenced to 15 Months in Jail, NBC NEWS 
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michelle-carter-convicted-
texting-suicide-case-sentenced-15-months-jail-n789276. 
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litigation. In particular, the fact that this case hinges on Carter’s 
simple instruction to her boyfriend to “get back in” his car has the 
potential to open a Pandora’s Box of criminal liability. The 
following discussion will examine the possible ramifications of the 
Carter holding, particularly focusing on concerns regarding the 
First Amendment’s protection of speech.  
A. Freedom of Speech and Expression 
The First Amendment provides that, “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”212 This constitutional 
protection extends to spoken and written words, as well as 
expressive conduct.213 However, the First Amendment does not 
provide an unrestrained right to speech. Forms of criminal speech 
falling outside the shelter of the First Amendment include, but are 
not limited to, obscenity, true threats, defamation, fighting words, 
and speech inciting or integral to criminal conduct.214 Of course, the 
encouragement of suicide does not fall under any of those 
categories—not even incitement or speech integral to criminal 
behavior, since suicide is no longer a crime in the United States.215 
In the wake of Melchert-Dinkel,216 the constitutionality of any 
statutory law prohibiting the encouragement of suicide may 
potentially be called into question, particularly because these laws 
are worded similarly and in broad terms.217 If statutes of this type 
continue to be found in violation of the First Amendment, they 
must pass a strict scrutiny test.218 Under this test, a content-based 
 
 212. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 213. David L. Hudson, Expressive Conduct and Symbolic Speech, LEGAL ALMANAC: THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:9 (2012). 
 214. See Brent Christensen, Sacrifice, Lies, and the First Amendment: How the Supreme 
Court Struck Down the Stolen Valor Act, 25 DCBA BRIEF 32, 33 (2012). 
 215. See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 19–20 (Minn. 2014) (finding that the 
encouragement of suicide does not fall under the scope of incitement or speech integral to 
criminal conduct because suicide was “not illegal in any of the jurisdictions at issue”). 
Although speech encouraging suicide can result in harm, “the Supreme Court has never 
recognized an exception to the First Amendment for speech that is integral to merely harmful 
conduct, as opposed to illegal conduct.” Id. 
 216. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 217. See supra note 109. These statutes all tend to contain broad wording similar to the 
Minnesota statute at issue in Melchert-Dinkel, imposing criminal liability for anyone who 
willfully advises or encourages another to commit suicide. See supra note 105.; see also 
Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 16. 
 218. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011). 
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restriction of protected speech is only permitted if the restriction: 
“[(1)] is justified by a compelling government interest and [(2)] is 
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”219 
While many courts would agree that preventing suicide is a 
compelling interest,220 legislators face the lofty challenge of 
narrowly tailoring the language of the statute to serve the interest 
of preventing suicide. This is where the Minnesota statute failed in 
Melchert-Dinkel.221 The United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized that “a law rarely survives such scrutiny.”222 
1. Where do we draw the line? 
As with many controversial holdings, a concern at the heart of 
the Michelle Carter case is where exactly citizens should expect the 
future line to be drawn between innocent and guilty conduct in 
electronic suicide discussions. Theoretically, this could be a 
slippery slope for courts to tread down.  
For instance, in response to a particularly obnoxious YouTube 
video or controversial blog post, it certainly would not be 
uncommon to see a slew of comments encouraging the posters of 
such content to “do the world a favor” and kill themselves. While 
comments like this, whether made in seriousness or jest, are truly 
unkind and can end in tragedy,223 it is likely not in the country’s 
best interest to censor online and electronic speech encouraging 
suicide because of the line-drawing confusion such laws would 
elicit. As another example, it is possible that a well-meaning 
telephone operator offering comfort and sympathy on a suicide 
hotline could face criminal charges for encouraging suicide if the 
individual on the other end of the phone actually killed herself after 
listening to the operator’s particular words.  
 
 219. Id. 
 220. E.g., Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 22 (holding that the government “has a 
compelling interest in preserving human life”). It should be noted, of course, that preventing 
suicide may not always remain quite as compelling of an interest as it is today, especially as 
societal attitudes condemning suicide continue to shift, and more physician-assisted suicide 
statutes are enacted. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 221. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 24. 
 222. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992). 
 223. See Michael E. Miller, ‘Killed Myself. Sorry.’: Transgender Game Developer Jumps Off 
Bridge After Online Abuse, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/28/killed-myself-sorry-transgender-game-developer-
jumps-off-bridge-after-online-abuse/?utm_term=.595e77a1ef9e. 
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These hypothetical illustrations are admittedly distinguishable 
from the specific situation in Carter of a defendant personally 
urging their long-term boyfriend to get back in a vehicle filled with 
carbon monoxide and complete his attempted suicide. But the 
outcome in Carter undoubtedly sets a troubling precedent for 
electronic speech. The holding indicates that words alone, even 
uttered by a faraway speaker over the phone or transmitted from a 
long distance through text messages, may qualify as direct 
causation of a suicide.  
The court in Carter refused to draw any kind of line between 
speech and physical action under the involuntary manslaughter 
criteria.224 This is problematic. As discussed earlier,225 the attitude 
toward suicide has shifted for many citizens in the last few decades. 
Based on society’s softened attitude toward suicide, the state 
legislature should respond by creating some kind of explicit 
boundaries between culpable and non-culpable conduct in order to 
clarify what that state’s attitude is toward suicide. If not, there is 
danger that the common law or poorly-worded encouragement 
statutes will ensnare innocent people and innocent conduct in their 
widely cast net. 
2. The chilling effect 
In particular, even if conduct encouraging suicide is not 
criminalized, the confusion and outrage that many have expressed 
regarding Michelle Carter’s case226 could create unintended 
consequences.  The holding could discourage people from 
engaging in perfectly lawful discussions and conduct for fear of 
being punished, effectively chilling speech surrounding suicide.227 
Even if preventing suicide is a compelling government interest, it 
cannot reasonably be any state’s intent to discourage all open 
discussions and conversations relating to suicide and end-of-life 
 
 224. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1063 (Mass. 2016) (“We need not—and 
indeed cannot—define where on the spectrum between speech and physical acts involuntary 
manslaughter must fall. Instead, the inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 225. See supra Section I.A. 
 226. See, e.g., Robby Soave, Opinion, Michelle Carter Didn’t Kill with a Text, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/opinion/michelle-carter-didnt-
kill-with-a-text.html (raising concerns that in Carter’s case, “the court . . . dealt a blow to the 
constitutionally enshrined idea that speech is not, itself, violence”). 
 227. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 973. 
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decisions. Suicide is certainly a heavy and often disturbing topic of 
discussion, but “[i]f there be time to expose . . . [and] avert the evil 
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence.”228 
B. The Future of Assisted Suicide Groups 
Another potential dilemma involves whether the court’s 
reasoning in Carter will affect the future of assisted suicide for the 
terminally ill. For example, “can a doctor (or close friend or loved 
one) talk to a terminally ill patient (or friend) if that mentally 
capable person has made the decision to end their life? Dare they 
agree in writing . . . with the loved one’s decision?”229 Of course, in 
Carter, the court takes care to state that Michelle Carter’s case “is 
not about a person seeking to ameliorate the anguish of someone 
coping with a terminal illness and questioning the value of life” nor 
“about a person offering support, comfort, and even assistance to a 
mature adult who . . . has decided to end his or her life.”230 
However, this is dicta.231 Thus, theoretically, those offering advice 
or encouragement on end-of-life decisions, whether in-person or 
through more remote forms of communication like text messages, 
may be subject to criminal prosecution in any jurisdiction that finds 
the reasoning in Carter to be persuasive. This notion becomes 
particularly unsettling in the context of online groups, such as 
suicide chat rooms or forums.232 How far does the liability for 
suicide encouragement extend? Could every member of such 
groups who dares to submit a comment that casts suicide in a 
positive light be charged with criminal conduct?  
 
 228. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 229. Philip Nitschke, Opinion, Euthanasia by Text? Michelle Carter Case Impacts More 
Than Just Free Speech, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June 20, 2017, 12:15 AM), 
http://www.smh.com.au/comment/euthanasia-by-text-lessons-from-the-michelle-carter-
case-20170625-gwxzoo.html. 
 230. Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1064 (Mass. 2016). 
 231. Id. “A statement is dictum if it could have been deleted without seriously 
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding and—being peripheral—may not have 
received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered it,” and therefore is not 
binding. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 223 (2019). Because they would not impair the foundations of the 
court’s holding, the statements made in Carter describing what the case “is not about” fit 
within this definition of dictum. 
 232. See supra notes 159–163 and accompanying text. 
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Such a broad and uncertain scope of liability for suicide 
encouragement flies in the face of the First Amendment, 
particularly for those who frequently discuss the issue of suicide in 
group settings. While most would agree that romanticizing suicide 
is a disturbing use of one’s right to freedom of speech, suicide is 
also an important area of discussion and debate. “If there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”233  
V. SOLUTIONS 
“The remedy for this situation is in the Legislature.”234 The 
underlying argument in this Note is that current statutory laws 
prohibiting the encouragement of suicide and common law suicide 
principles such as those detailed in Michelle Carter’s case are 
potentially outdated. There is no settled precedent for words or 
psychological coercion alone qualifying as the cause for suicide.235 
And now, modern technology has enabled people to interact and 
communicate with each other with an ease and at a magnitude that 
would have been incomprehensible to lawmakers in the earlier 
days of suicide litigation. It is reasonable to assume that as time 
goes on, technology will only become a more inescapable part of 
life, and cases like Michelle Carter’s will not be uncommon. 
A. The Need to Address Encouragement of Suicide  
in Statutory Suicide Laws 
Because of the concerns of modern technology implicating the 
rights of free speech, this Note agrees with the Melchert-Dinkel 
standard that penalizing someone for another’s suicide based 
broadly on encouragement, without more, is a violation of the First 
 
 233. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). This First Amendment protection covers 
even words that may cause psychological and emotional pain. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 
443 (2011). “Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy 
and sorrow, and . . . inflict great pain. . . . As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even 
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.” Id. at 460–61. 
 234. People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). Prefacing the 
suggestion of legislative remediation in this case, the court found that “[w]hat conduct 
constitutes the crime of incitement to suicide is vague, and undefined and no reasonably 
ascertainable standard of guilt has been set forth.” Id. 
 235. See supra Section I.B.1.a.(1). 
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Amendment.236 This standard strikes the right balance because, 
while criminalizing words encouraging suicide, it still requires the 
words to actually enable the suicide through specific instructions 
or other verbal aid. 
This Note acknowledges, of course, that some states desire to 
maintain their traditional suicide encouragement provisions; 
however, every state should closely examine such provisions to 
ensure that they are not overly inclusive. Any law criminalizing the 
encouragement of suicide must likely pass strict scrutiny, requiring 
the states to narrowly tailor the statute’s language to the compelling 
government interest of preventing suicide.237 In addition, it is 
important for states to make clarifications in all assisted-suicide 
laws whether words alone can qualify as assistance, or if physical 
action or presence is required. One suitable example of this is the 
Illinois statutory law on suicide inducement, which provides: 
(a) A person commits inducement to commit suicide when he or 
she does either of the following: 
(1) Knowingly coerces another to commit suicide and the 
other person commits or attempts to commit suicide as a 
direct result of the coercion, and he or she exercises 
substantial control over the other person through (i) control 
of the other person’s physical location or circumstances;  
(ii) use of psychological pressure; or (iii) use of actual or 
ostensible religious, political, social, philosophical or  
other principles. 
(2) With knowledge that another person intends to commit or 
attempt to commit suicide, intentionally (i) offers and 
provides the physical means by which another person 
commits or attempts to commit suicide, or (ii) participates in 
a physical act by which another person commits or attempts 
to commit suicide.238 
 
 236. See supra notes 164–177 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 974–75. Sweeney offers several recommendations 
for how to narrowly tailor a statute prohibiting the encouragement of suicide. Id. These 
include: (1) explicitly including a high mens rea requirement, such as “knowingly”; (2) 
requiring some degree of interaction between the defendant and the victim; and (3) requiring 
prosecutors to show both a subjective and objective component to prove culpability in the 
defendant’s conduct. Id. 
 238. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-34.5 (2011). 
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While this statute is not perfect, the Illinois legislature has done 
an admirable job in attempting to establish more definitive and 
straightforward protocols for which kinds of behavior lead to 
suicide liability. In particular, Illinois law indicates that words 
alone may be enough to criminalize suicide encouragement if the 
suicide is a “direct result” of the inducement, and if the encourager 
has “substantial control” over the victim, such as through the 
power of “psychological pressure.”239 The language of the statute 
narrows the scope of criminal behavior. It reduces the line-drawing 
problems240 of common-law jurisdictions like Massachusetts, or of 
states with overly broad statutes prohibiting all forms of suicide 
encouragement. Thus, if states desire to punish suicide 
encouragement, the legislature should follow the example of 
Illinois. It should enact statutes with clear-cut suicide 
encouragement guidelines, dictating when one’s words of support 
or reassurance become criminal. 
B. The Need to Address Electronic Communications  
in Statutory Suicide Laws 
Many states, of course, have already enacted suicide legislation, 
but they should take the influence of cyberspace into account. They 
should consider whether that realm is pervasive enough to 
necessitate amendments. Specifically, state legislatures should 
consider enacting or revising their statutes to explain where 
electronic communications fit within the context of encouraging or 
assisting suicide. If the act of encouraging suicide by electronic 
means will constitute a crime, then statutory law should be clear on 
that point in order to provide fair notice.241 Suicide should not be 
litigated under a theory of common law involuntary manslaughter, 
like it was in Michelle Carter’s case. Instead, states should 
specifically create legislation pertaining to suicide assistance and 
possibly suicide encouragement. Within these statutes, states 
should address whether physical action or a physical presence is 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
 241. McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning should 
be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law 
intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line 
should be clear.”). 
006.TAYLOR_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:52 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
650 
 
needed, or if a virtual presence can be sufficient in the context of 
modern technology. Above all, states should enact careful 
legislation to provide clear guidelines on exactly what conduct, 
virtual or not, is lethal within suicide law. 
Some observers have argued that legislatures do not need to 
make special statutes just to incorporate electronic communications 
into current law. During a 1996 presentation, Judge Frank H. 
Easterbrook described leaders at the University of Chicago Law 
School as “proud” that the school did not offer a course covering 
“The Law of the Horse.”242 Obviously, Easterbrook did not say this 
to insult those who specialize in legal battles surrounding livestock; 
instead, his remark reflected the opinion that legal areas of study 
“should be limited to subjects that c[an] illuminate the entire 
law. . . . Only by putting the law of the horse in the context of 
broader rules about commercial endeavors c[an] one really 
understand the law about horses.”243 Easterbrook applied this 
principle to the Internet, implying that most conduct in cyberspace 
is easily classifiable under already-existing legal principles.244 
One could argue that the law of the horse applies to statutory 
law as well. In other words, perhaps no statutes at all should 
specifically address digital behavior. Instead, maybe all actions 
conducted electronically should be examined within the scope of 
more general, existing laws. On the other hand, it is evident that 
Judge Easterbrook, speaking at a conference in 1996, simply could 
not have foreseen the way that technology and the Internet would 
come to pervade every corner of the modern world in such a brief 
span of time. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that his point 
comparing the legal issues surrounding technology and cyberspace 
to “the law of the horse” is rather antiquated. 
While maintaining the rigidity of certain laws, constitutions, 
and statutes within the United States is an imperative duty of the 
legislature, no one can deny that emerging technologies can 
 
 242. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,  
207 (1996). 
 243. Id. at 207–08. 
 244. Id.; see also JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & PROBLEMS 9 (7th ed. 
2017) (“To this day, ‘the law of the horse’ is a code phrase among scholars for the idea that 
there’s nothing new here, that studying Internet law is nothing more than an exercise in 
applying unrelated bodies of law to the Internet, with no unifying doctrines or truly 
distinctive insights.”). 
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sometimes, and perhaps often do, change the rules of the game. 
That is the biggest concern about Michelle Carter’s case. The 
judicial branch took it upon itself to expand the state’s common law 
suicide theories to include culpability for words alone. It did so 
without seriously considering the difference between a virtual and 
physical presence. It arguably did so without any valid precedent 
or statute to justify such a holding under the specific circumstances. 
If the state of Massachusetts wishes to criminalize behavior like 
Carter’s, then the legislature should enact a clear and narrowly-
tailored statute. The statute should address the criminality of both 
suicide assistance and suicide encouragement, as well as where 
electronic communications fall within the scope of culpability for 
such behavior.  
Ultimately, the decision to expand the law under these 
circumstances should not have been left in judicial hands. The 
Constitution of the United States vests specific governmental 
powers in three branches of government, which are each meant to 
remain distinct and separate.245 Generally speaking, the judiciary’s 
role is to apply and interpret laws created by the people’s elected 
representatives, not to legislate from the bench. Thus, it is essential 
that “judges resist the temptation to become politicians in robes.”246 
The Founders of this nation recognized that, “[w]ere the power of 
judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject 
would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be 
the legislator.”247 While it is important to most states, including 
Massachusetts, to deter any kind of suicide-enabling behavior, this 
endeavor should begin with the legislature. 
As for other jurisdictions that already have such suicide 
statutes, these laws should potentially be amended to narrow any 
overly inclusive language that could violate the First Amendment. 
They should address the issues of electronic communications and 
virtual presence. Such laws cannot remain generalized. Stretching 
current law in order to hold an individual accountable for another 
person’s suicide is an ill-advised endeavor for courts to pursue.248 
 
 245. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1. 
 246. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Lecture, Politicians in Robes: The Separation of Powers and 
the Problem of Judicial Legislation, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 31, 49 (2015). 
 247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 302–03 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904). 
 248. See generally supra Section III.A.1. 
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In the case of Drew, the Missouri lawmakers understood that the 
state’s harassment laws needed amendments to compensate for 
changing technologies.249 Likewise, states should amend or enact 
suicide laws to meet the needs of the digital era. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Note is not to defend Michelle Carter. 
Suicide remains a devastating problem in the United States,250 and 
Carter’s conduct is undoubtedly “morally reprehensible” to many 
American citizens.251 Indeed, perhaps a carefully constructed 
suicide statute could have led a court to reach the same conclusion 
as to Michelle Carter’s guilt under the law. However, in the absence 
of such a statute, Michelle Carter’s verbal advisement and 
encouragement of her boyfriend’s suicide solely through electronic 
communications, without anything more, should not have resulted 
in a guilty verdict under Massachusetts common law. 
It is particularly telling that in reaching Michelle Carter’s guilty 
verdict, Judge Moniz had to rely on a 200-year-old case,252 instead of 
on any modern law that reflects new technologies and the current 
attitudes toward suicide. Ultimately, Carter’s conviction represents 
a judicial decision to expand the state’s suicide law by not requiring 
physical presence or assistance to find the defendant guilty without 
going through the proper means—the legislature. 
Thomas Jefferson once asserted that,  
laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of 
the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more 
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, 
and manners and opinions change with the change of 
 
 249. See supra notes 147–150 and accompanying text. 
 250. Suicide is the tenth leading cause of death for Americans in general, and it is the 
second leading cause of death for individuals specifically between ages ten and thirty-four. 
See 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, United States – 2014, NAT’L CTR. FOR  
INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/images/lc-charts/leading_ 
causes_of_death_age_group_2014_1050w760h.gif (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
 251. Veronika Bondarenko, 20-Year-Old Who Repeatedly Urged Friend to Commit Suicide 
Found Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2017, 11:36 AM), http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/michelle-carter-texting-suicide-guilty-conrad-roy-2017-6. 
 252. Glaun, supra note 22; see also Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816). 
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circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with 
the times.253  
The digital world continues to change the way that people interact 
and communicate with each other. Lawmakers should recognize 
that there is a difference between a defendant who loads a gun and 
physically places it in his suicidal wife’s hands,254 and a defendant 
who is miles away, merely encouraging her boyfriend through text 
messages and phone conversations to follow through with a suicide 
plan the victim devised himself. 
Overall, if an individual’s electronic communications may 
implicate her as blameworthy for another’s suicide, this should be 
clearly codified into law. The digital world is moving relentlessly 
fast, and our legislation must strive to keep up. However, it is not 
the role of the judiciary to set the pace. 
Sierra Taylor* 
  
 
 253. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-samuel-kercheval/ (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 254. See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961). 
*  J.D., 2019, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.  
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